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language was held unnecessarily abusive was Tresca v. Maddox, 8
in which defendant called the plaintiff in a newspaper article "as
mild a man as ever scuttled a ship or cut a throat." The court
also held that the defendant's subsequent retraction of the state-
ment should be considered only in mitigation of damages. In
another case, 9 the court allowed recovery upon a general show-
ing of personal enmity between the parties involved. The lan-
guage used, however, was extreme, charging plaintiff with being
of "an ungovernable temper, feeble minded, and unfit to teach."
That accusation, coupled with the factor of previous ill feeling




THE EFFECT OF DISCHARGES IN BANKRUPTCY ON
TORTS JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO
KEEPING OF ANIMALS
Section 17(a) of the National Bankruptcy Act provides, "A
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such
as ... (2) are liabilities ... for wilful and malicious injuries to
person or property of another .... -1
Undoubtedly the purpose and intention of Congress in enact-
ing this measure was to allow the honest debtor to clean the
slate of his financial burden. But an exception was provided so
that the intentional tortfeasor would be unable to escape liability
through the expediency of a discharge in bankruptcy. This excep-
tion is quite applicable, and certainly appropriate, to cases involv-
ing intentional wrongs or when the defendant's conduct is grossly
shocking to moral sensibilities. However, in those cases where
the rule of absolute liability obtains, a person may be held in
48. 11 La. Ann. 206 (1856).
49. Sims v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La. App. 1940).
* A substantial part of the research work which led to the preparation
of this comment was done by Mr. Rosenthal as a research project in the
Torts course at Louisiana State University. Mr. Rosenthal served as a
member of the armed forces and has been missing in action since December
13, 1944.
1. 52 Stat. 851, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (Supp. 1944).
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damages for the injury caused even though he was neither an
intentional wrongdoer or a morally blameworthy individual and
would be unable to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy of the
judgment levied against him.
This type of absolute liability afforded by law is exemplified
in cases relating to blasting operations,2 maintenance of nui-
sances,3 and keepers of animals.4 These torts, however, are char-
acterized as wilful wrongs and the question arises whether or
not these wrongs so characterized should prevent a discharge in
bankruptcy, disregarding the moral element suggested in the
act by Congress.
In a recent case 5 it was held that the owner of a dog, known
to him to be vicious, and who had been successfully sued by a
person bitten by the dog, would be liable under the judgment
despite an intervening discharge in bankruptcy. The court based
its decision upon the fact that the dog was kept with knowledge
2. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F. (2d) 510 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931);
Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 Pac. 395 (1886); Fitzsimons & Connell
Co. v. Braun & Fitts, 199 Ill. 390, 65 N.E. 249 (1902); Adams & Sullivan v.
Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S.W. 974 (1917); Gossett v. Southern Ry., 115 Tenn.
376, 89 S.W. 737 (1905). Recovery is allowed under the majority view for dam-
ages resulting from concussions and vibrations due to blasting irrespective
of negligence of the defendant. See Watson v. Mississippi River Power Co.,
174 Iowa 23, 156 N.W. 188 (1916); Longton v. Persell, 30 Mont. 306, 76 Pac.
699 (1904); Wendt v. Yant Const. Co., 125 Neb. 272, 249 N.W. 599 (1933);
Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N.E. 970 (1914). Contra: Bessemer
Coal, Iron & Land Co. v. Doak, 152 Ala. 166, 44 So. 627 (1907); Lewis v. Dun-
bar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 897, 178 Misc. 980 (1942); Co-
manche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 298 S.W. 554 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927).
3. Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753 (1923); Laflin-Rand Powder
Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322, 23 N.E. 389 (1890); Bowman v. Humphrey, 132
Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906); Healey v. Citizens' Gas & Electric Co., 199 Iowa
82, 201 N.W. 118 (1924); Hannem v. Pence, 40 Minn. 127, 41 N.W. 657 (1889);
Stuhl v. Great Northern Ry., 136 Minn. 158, 161 N.W. 501 (1917); Boyle v.
Neisner Bros. Inc., 230 Mo. App. 90, 87 S.W.(2d) 227 (1935); Smith v. City of
Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E: 787 (1899); Higginbotham v. Kearse, 111 W. Va.
264, 161 S.E. 37 (1931).
4. Phillips v. Garner, 106 Miss. 828, 64 So. 735 (1914); Anmons v. Kellogg,
137 Miss. 551, 102 So. 562 (1925); Emmons v. Stevane, 77 N.J. Law 570, 73 At.
544 (1909); Crowley v. Groonell, 73 Vt. 45, 50 Atl. 546 (1901) (the nature of the
dog is immaterial if the owner knows he will injure people while acting play-
fully or otherwise).
5. Jaco v. Baker, 148 P.(2d) 938 (Ore. 1944). Accord: Yackel v. Nys, 258
App. Div. 318, 16 N.Y.S.(2d) 545 (1939) and Beam v. Karaim, 47 N.Y.S.(2d)
193 (1944). In each of these cases the owner harbored a dog known to be of
a vicious, mischievous and dangerous nature. The dogs were allowed to
roam at large. The courts did not investigate whether the owners were
moral wrong-doers, but decided them on the issue of knowledge of the danger-
ous characteristics of the animals. This was wilful and malicious within the
intendment of the bankruptcy act. See also Humphreys v. Heller, 157 Misc.
568, 283 N.Y. Supp. 915, 916 (1935), in which the court said: "Negligence in
the ordinary sense is not th gravamen of the action . . .; the action is predi-
cated upon a willful and intentional act, namely the keeping of a ferocious
animal with knowledge of its viciousness."
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of its propensities, which it termed a "wilful and malicious" act.
No inquiry into the actual blameworthiness of defendant was
instigated.
Imposition of strict liability upon those who were keepers
of animals originated in the early English law. This rule, as it
applied to owners and keepers6 of dogs, was stated in the case
of Smith v. Pelah,7 decided in 1760. Fault was not predicated
upon the basis of negligence, but ownership coupled with knowl-
edge of the animal's viciousness. These two factors precluded
the defendant's plea of reasonable care, contributory negligence
of the victim or any other convenient defense posed by the
wrongdoer. This rule has been extended into modem times, and
as the usefulness of dogs becomes lessened in urban living there
is a tendency on the part of some states to attach liability by
statute based solely on possession.8 Therefore, with this strict
rule firmly embedded in the law of our land, the necessity of
interpreting and applying the varying degrees of negligence has
not confronted the bankruptcy courts in the dog cases. The
6. Liability for injuries by dangerous animals is predicated upon posses-
sion rather than ownership. What constitutes ownership is determined by
the factual situation Involving possession as in any other chattel. The pos-
sessor must harbor the animal by assuming custody, management and con-
trol and the mere presence of the animal on the premises is not sufincient
proof of ownership. The fact that the owner fails to immediately eject the
animal from his premises does not necessarily indicate that he is responsible
for the depredations caused by it. Hays v. Miller, 150 Ala. 621, 43 So. 818
(1907); Trumble v. Happy, 114 Iowa 624, 87 N.W. 678 (1901) (dog being found
on premises infrequently does not constitute possession); Alexander v.
Crosby, 143 Iowa 50, 119 N.W. 717 (1909) (harborer of a dog not known to be
vicious not liable, as responsibility shifted to owner); Whittemore v.
Thomas, 153 Mass. 347, 26 N.E. 875 (1891) (dog used occasionally to watch
hogs, defendant not keeper); Boylan v. Everett, 172 Mass. 453, 52 N.E. 541
(1899) (occasional feeding and caressing of a dog does not constitute posses-
sion as a matter of law); Redmond v. National Horse Show Ass'n, 78 Misc.
Rep. 383, 138 N.Y. Supp. 364 (1912). However, if one permits another to
harbor an animal on his premises which he knows is dangerous, especially if
he tenders food or shelter in any manner or exercises some degree of control
or If he is designated head of the family and grants permission to a mem-
ber of the family group to bring In an animal, he may be regarded as its
keeper. White v. Sens, 13 La. App. 343, 127 So. 413 (1930); Maillet v. Mininno,
266 Mass. 86, 165 N.E. 15 (1929) (dog allowed to stay in the house at will and
was given food, defendant held to be keeper); Manger v. Shipman, 30 Neb.
352, 46 N.W. 527 (1890) (wolf left by younger brother was kept tied near store
and fed scraps-older brother held to be keeper); Quilty v. Battie, 135 N.Y.
201, 32 N.E. 47 (1892) (wife owned the premises, husband the dog, but she
was held to be keeper by her acquiescence); Harris v. Williams, 160 Okla.
103, 15 P.(2d) 580 (1932).
The landlord, ordinarily not liable for the negligent acts of his tenants, is
held accountable for injuries caused by a vicious dog if the lessor retains
control over entire premises. See In re Lorde, 144 Fed. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1906).
7. Smith v. Pelah, 2 Str. 1265, 93 Eng. Rep. 1171 k1760).
8. Cal. Gen. Laws (1931) Act 384a, § 1; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann.
(Skillman, 1927) § 7044; La. Act 111 of 1886, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3811;
Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 24-D-1.
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bankrupt's act under these circumstances is characterized,
whether rightly or wrongly, as wilful and malicious.
In many cases, such as those involving violation of auto-
mobile guest statutes, conversion and others, the courts attempt
to individualize the situations and distinguish the conduct of
the person involved by declaring him to be simply negligent,
grossly negligent or finally guilty of an intentional wrong con-
stituting a wilful and malicious act. This procedure seems to
accord with the intent of the lawmakers as an interpretation of
the section of the bankruptcy act under discussion. How are we
then to justify the arbitrary position assumed by the courts, as
in. the principal case, where no effort is made to investigate and
determine the moral character of the bankrupt's conduct?
Any claim that the courts have perfectly interpreted and
applied the term "wilful and malicious injury" to all of the
varying situations relating to automobile cases in the many
jurisdictions would be wholly unsupported by the decisions.9
Acts by automobile drivers which have been held under guest
statutes to be only gross negligence, or less, have been regarded
by the bankruptcy courts as wilful and malicious conduct, and
judgments based on such conduct are frequently preserved in
the face of an intervening discharge.10
9. In re Longdo, 45 F.(2d) 246 (N.D. N.Y. 1930), where defendant bank-
rupt drove his car at an excessive rate of speed around a line of vehicles
waiting for the traffic signal to change and crossed into a main intersection,
injuring pedestrian. This court granted the discharge of his liability; even
though his act was reckless and wanton, it was not a wilful wrong. In
Greene v. Lane, 87 F.(2d) 951 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937), the Illinois court refused to
discharge a judgment against the bankrupt who had wantonly driven his
car through a stop signal and struck appellee. See also Bordonano v. Senk,
109 Conn. 428, 147 Atl. 136 (1929); Rogers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51
(1935); In re Dutkiewicz, 27 F.(2d) 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1928); In re Tillery, 16
F. Supp. 877 (1936); Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N.W.(2d) 417 (1944),
where the driver was intoxicated and operating the vehicle in a reckless
and wanton manner yet the judgment was discharged. Contra: In re Wilson,
269 Fed. 845 (D. Md. 1920).
An even more confusing position is taken by the Vermont court which
refuses to discharge a liability incurred for damages resulting from an inten-
tional violation of a statute. Ex Parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
This decision has been held to be incompatible with the interpretation given
the term "wilful and malicious injury" in most jurisdictions because of its
liberality. It is, however, analogous to the position taken by the cases in the
dog situations in that it is an arbitrary rule relating to the defendant's con-
duct in violating a statute.
10. Romer v. Kaplan, 315 Mass. 736, 54 N.E.(2d) 673 (1944). Defendant
drove carelessly over a rough road despite the pleas of a passenger who had
recently been operated on. Held, not gross negligence under the Massachu-
setts rule which implies intent as a necessary element to liability. But see
Kennard v. Palmer, 143 Ohio St. 1, 53 N.E.(2d) 652 (1943). The driver was
guilty of wilful and wanton negligence when he drove his car from one side
of the road to the other at excessive rate of speed not heeding pleas from
a guest. Injury resulted. See also De Simone v. Pedonti, 308 Mass. 373, 32
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The cases in which courts have found judgments for the
conversion of property stand in interesting contrast with the
animal cases. The tort of conversion, like that of harboring a
vicious animal, usually enjoys the legal reputation of an "inten-
tional" wrong. Also in the conversion cases, like those which
involve the keeping of dangerous animals, the defendant's con-
duct has a large variety of moral complexions. Some conversions
are highly reprehensible in nature, while others are entirely
blameless from an ethical point of view and bear the stigma of
"misconduct" only through sheer legal implication. In bank-
ruptcy proceedings the courts have mediated among the various
types of conversions and have sought to determine each case
in the light of the moral factors involved.1'
An assault is commonly regarded as the prototype of anti-
social, and hence "wilful and malicious" misconduct. Even here,
however, there are strong indications that the courts may refuse
to preserve arbitrarily judgments based on assaults against the
bankruptcy discharge. 2 This position seems to be defensible. One
who has been found to have exceeded the legitimate bounds of
self defense and has struck the "unnecessary blow" may still not
N.E.(2d) 612 (1941); Driscoll v. Pagano, 313 Mass. 464, 48 N.E.(2d) 11 (1943);
Corrigan v. Clark, 36 A.(2d) 631 (1944).
11. Russell v. Peters, 219 Iowa 708, 259 N.W. 197 (1935). Tenant disposed
of all his crops, including the one-half share due lessor. Judgment excepted
from discharge. With this case compare Continental Livestock Co. v.
King, 283 Mich. 495, 278 N.W. 661 (1938) and Damato v. Ambrose, 122 N.J.
Law 539, 6 A.(2d) 189 (1939). In these cases the bankrupt converted prop-
erty or money but the court failed to find the specific intent element neces-
sary to constitute a wilful injury. See Baker v. Bryant Fertilizer Co., 271
Fed. 473 (C.C.A. 4th, 1921); In re Frazzetta, 1 F. Supp. 122 (W.D. N.Y. 1932);
In re Nordlight, 3 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); In re Binskey, 6 F. Supp.
789 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); In re La Porte, 54 F. Supp. 911 (W.D. N.Y. 1943);
Kavanaugh v. McIntyre, 210 N.Y. 175, 104 N.E. 135 (1914); Woelfe v. Giles,
184 S.W.(2d) 177 (Tenn. 1945); Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328,
55 S.Ct. 151, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934).
12. In Thibodeau v. Martin, 140 Me. 179, 35 A.(2d) 653 (1944); Gorczyca
v. Stanock, 308 Ill. App. 235, 31 N.E.(2d) 403 (1941); Thompson v. Judy, 169
Fed. 553 (C.C.A. 6th, 1909); In re Conroy, 237 Fed. 817 (C.C.A. 2d, 1916); In re
Wernecke, 1 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. N.Y. 1932); In re Pacer, 5 F. Supp. 439
(W.D. N.Y. 1933), the bankrupt assaulted the judgment creditor and his act
was held to be wilful and malicious. But see In re De Lauro, 1 F. Supp. 678
(D.C. Conn. 1932); In which it was held that under the Connecticut law, a
general judgment for assault does not necessarily import wilfulness even
though alleged in the complaint. Contra: Peters v. United States ex rel.
Kelley, 177 Fed. 885, 888 (C.C.A. 7th, 1910). The court said: "By the law of
Illinois (or generally elsewhere) a judgment for damages under a count for
trespass vi et armis cannot lawfully be rendered except upon proof of a
wilful and malicious injury." It was strongly urged upon the court that in
pleas of castigavit, son assault demense and the replication de injuria, a
recovery could be had for an excessive use of force employed beyond reason-
able chastisement and the judgment would not be conclusive upon the court
that the offender was guilty of a wilful and malicious assault.
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be regarded as guilty of conduct so anti-social in nature as to
preclude his taking final refuge behind a discharge in bankruptcy.
Therefore, it might be suggested that since the courts are
willing to individualize the various situations involving moral
conduct of the bankrupt, it would be appropriate to proceed in
this manner in the animal cases. The defendant, as in the prin-
cipal case, would be discharged in bankruptcy under this pro-
cedure if his act in keeping the dog was not for the purpose of
committing an intentional wrong or in reckless disregard of the
safety of others. The arbitrary rule of fixing liability based on
defendant's knowledge of a single prior attack by the animal
would be dispensed with.
CRAWFoRD H. DowNs
ACTION BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AGAINST UNTRUTHFUL ADVERTISING
SINCE 1940
As a part of a symposium in the George Washington Law
Review under the title "Unfair Competition and the Federal
Trade Commission,"1 Professor Milton Handler discussed twenty-
seven methods of competition which have been condemned as
violative of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
introduction traces the reaction of the courts toward the work
of the Commission from its inception in 1914 to the time of the
publication in 1940. Under various subsections, a resum6 of
the work of the Federal Trade Commission in preventing un-
truthful and misleading advertising is discussed and an array of
the cases set forth. As a supplement to this latter phase of the
above work, this study seeks to show subsequent developments
in the principles of what constitutes untruthful and misleading
advertising as applied by the Commission, and brings the cases
up to date, discussing in somewhat greater detail the application
of these principles to the factual situations involved.
Something of a requisite maturity seems to have been at-
tained in the work of the Federal Trade Commission. Progressing
from its earliest decisions in which only the grossest type of mis-
statements were forbidden as untruthful (which decisions only
too often were then set aside by the courts), the Commission is
1. Handler, Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission (1940)
29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399.
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